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Introduction
There is often a right time to do things. In the 1570s, Martin Frobisher abandoned
his efforts to find the Northwest Passage, but the attempt might well have been
successful today. The nature of a problem and the technical tools available to tackle
it can change dramatically over time. Is this the right time for radical changes to Air
Traffic Management (ATM)? What will be the keys to success?
An earlier article in Navigation News (Jan/Feb 2007) examined the USA’s Air Traffic
Management (ATM) programme NGATS, now renamed ‘NextGen’. There has
recently been important progress in the European analogue to NextGen: SESAR.
SESAR is the European ATM modernization programme, focused on 2020. Its first
phase is the Definition Phase, which is co-funded by Eurocontrol and the European
Commission (Trans European networks). The SESAR Consortium is carrying out the
Definition Phase study. The Consortium has about 30 members (eg Air France, BAE
Systems) and about 20 associated partners (eg Boeing, Dassault, and European
ATM research centres).
A major ‘SESAR Deliverable’ was the 162-page ‘ATM Target Concept’, issued in late
September 2007. This briefing paper illustrates some of the important features of the
Concept, especially where its ‘magic’ might come from to deliver large improvements
in performance, and tries to identify key issues in the path to successful
implementation. The report’s authors make it very clear that it is a vision not a plan,
and certainly not a final blueprint of the future system.
SESAR Task and the Concept’s Main Features
What are the goals for SESAR? There are four ‘SESAR Performance Objectives’
(and many other performance criteria):
 Designed for more capacity: +73% in 2020
(compared to the 2005 situation)
… and enabling 3 times in the longer term;
 Improved safety: 3 times for 2020
… 10 times in the longer term;
 10% less environmental impact/flight due
to ATM;
 50% less [direct] ATM cost/flight.
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2These are demanding goals. Presentationally, it would be better if the safety goal is
first in the list: ATM is foremost about safety – in an imaginary world in which colliding
aircraft suffered no damage whatsoever there would be little need for ATM.
The Target Concept is built on aircraft flying, with high precision, 4-dimensional (4D,
ie position and time) Trajectories. The SESAR 2020 ingredients include:
 Business Trajectory at the System Core
 Trajectory Management Focus
 Collaborative Planning
 Integrated Airport Operations
 New Separation Modes
 System Wide Information Management (SWIM)
 Humans Central as Managers and Decision-makers
 Technology Enablers
Figure 1 expands on these headings, and the Executive Summary of the Concept
document is a further expanded version. Here, ADS-B (Automatic Dependent
Surveillance - Broadcast) is a core technology enabler – essentially through aircraft
text messaging (Figure 2). ADS-B equipment has been extensively and successfully
tested in operational environments, and is an example of a developed SESAR
technological component.
The Concept includes a variety of technical and operational options. The SESAR
Consortium notes that:
“The ATM Target Concept is not about one size/one solution fits all; it offers
different concept features which can be tailored to the specific local needs to
meet the local performance objectives and their evolution in the life time of
SESAR.”
SESAR Safety Thinking
It takes some effort to get a mental grip of the SESAR Concept. One approach is to
concentrate on the safety aspects of the proposed changes. Figure 3 is a schematic
– highly simplified – of the current Air Traffic Control (ATC) Concept of Operations. It
is largely self-explanatory, but there are some important features to note. First,
controllers are important, as stressed by their involvement in planning, negotiation
and the Safety Loop activities. Second, comparatively little is currently required from
aircraft in terms of accurate navigation. Third, much of ATM presently relies on voice
communication. Fourth, automated assistance focuses on warning systems: ground-
based Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA), and air-based Traffic Collision Avoidance
Systems (TCAS) – outside of the controller Safety Loop. STCA and TCAS both use
what is essentially radar data to spot potential conflicts rather than information from
aircraft or ground ATM systems.
3The basic idea behind the SESAR Concept is to structure ATM around aircraft
‘Trajectory Based Operations’. This is not a new idea, but its time seems to have
arrived because of actual and potential system developments:
Accuracy/reliability of aircraft-achieved 4D trajectory
Accuracy/speed of passing information via data link
Huge improvements in surveillance capabilities
Automation and Decision Support Tool capabilities
Huge improvements in computer/equipment processing power and speed
What ‘magic’ do these offer when combined? Figure 4 sketches the safety thinking
underpinning SESAR-like ideas – the starting point for the system design. Most of
the linkages and boxes in Figure 4 are straightforward, but ‘Position Integrity’ and
‘Reasonable Intent’ need some additional explanation. (FMS stands for Flight
Management Systems.)
‘Precursor modes’ here means that an accident has to start with something going
wrong: given ATM’s developed safety defences, there would then need to be other
problems before a ‘safety incident’ turned into an accident. A Position Integrity risk
could occur if an aircraft has a large undetectable altimetry error. A Reasonable
Intent risk could occur if a pilot misunderstood a clearance, and descended to the
wrong flight level; or if a controller issued a ‘non-reasonable’ clearance, perhaps
because of high task demands to resolve an existing conflict.
Figure 5 shows some statistics – unofficial – on recent Airproxes (= ATM incidents
reports). Controller and Pilot in the Figure indicate that the precursor was an
immediate human error/misjudgement etc. The Airspace category focuses on
incidents with airspace design and/or operational procedures that raise questions
about ways of de-conflicting traffic features. ‘Incorrect readback’ means that the pilot
incorrectly read back ATC instructions and that this was undetected by the controller.
There are at most three ‘Technical’ incidents, ie where use/failure of equipment was
involved. They were consequences of sudden cabin decompression, the misreading
of a navigational chart, and the failure of flightdeck procedures to detect an incorrect
setting on the flight computer.
The present systems incident/accident precursors are almost always from the right
hand top box – failures of Reasonable Intent. So, for a markedly different ATM
system to deliver safety, the system design – people, equipment, procedures – must
prevent or mitigate misunderstandings, distractions, etc. The SESAR concept does
this by ensuring that pilots and controllers possess the same picture of Intent, and
that data transfer is the normal mode rather than voice communications.
Returning to Figure 4, important elements are marked in bold type. They generally
represent the parts of the system changes that are most critical for SESAR to work
with the high level of safety required. One equivalence is crucial: controller taskload
~ airspace capacity. The ATM system’s throughput depends critically on the rate that
controllers can process aircraft through their airspace sectors. Thus, for example,
eliminating some voice communication tasks would – everything else being the same
– free some of the controller’s time, and hence enable a higher throughput.
4Investment Case
Figure 1 is dramatically different from today’s system. But commercial companies
invest money in the expectation of getting benefits. An investment case for SESAR
was first constructed by SDG (2005). The Concept paper also includes a financial
section, which concludes with an outline cost benefit analysis (CBA). Airspace users
gain financially in a variety of ways, eg reduced ATC charges, fuel saving on routes
that are more direct. They have to pay for new avionics kit on their aircraft, which
must also cover the costs of training aircrew to use the kit.
The Concept CBA is “‘what-if’ scenarios with only trend and rough order of
magnitude results”, and the Consortium suggests that they “should be considered
conservative”. In summary:
“[CBA] has not provided conclusive evidence that the ATM Target Concept will
be affordable or economically viable from an Airspace Users perspective.
This will require further work.”
The best scenario examined assumes that half the cost effectiveness target is
achieved (ie 25% less ATM cost/flight), because “there is incomplete evidence
that the cost effectiveness target is going to be met”. In this scenario, the
benefits are larger than costs for scheduled airlines (a ratio of 1.7), but
negative for business aviation and general aviation.
Information about the SESAR impacts on the military airspace users is difficult
to assess, and they are not included in the CBA. However, the current
estimates are that the costs to European military users, almost all for
investment in appropriate air platforms, would be €11.7 Billion. This is a
significant amount of money even in defence terms – it is probably more than
5% of Europe’s annual military spend.
“[T]he investment in the ATM Target Concept should be seen as long-term
and strategic in nature which would justify the need for public funding for
implementation.”
SDG(2005) and Brooker (2008) discuss benefits to society from SESAR. These
assessments are complex, but the most important benefit contribution from a
governmental viewpoint arise from passenger time-savings. There are more flights
available and fewer delays. These gains generate worthwhile increases in Europe’s
Gross Domestic Product, so governments should be sympathetic to such
investments.
But to get large amounts of public money requires proof to government decision-
makers that the concept will deliver in practice and that there can be confidence in
the estimates of costs and benefits. Governments have ‘had their fingers burned’ in
the past, so they will want to see hard evidence. This presumably implies the need
for convincing demonstrations of near full-scale operational SESAR systems.
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Figure 6, derived from an authoritative USA document, illustrates the nature and
scope of SWIM. SWIM provides the infrastructure and services to deliver network-
enabled information access to a multitude of ATM system users. It offers substantial
system architecture benefits by reducing the number and types of interfaces and
systems. Today’s system has many ‘evolved’ technical sub-systems with custom-
designed, developed, and managed connections. SESAR requires an infrastructure
that is capable of flexible growth – and the cost of expanding today’s variety of legacy
sub-systems is daunting. SWIM must successfully integrate with a variety of legacy
sub-systems over many years. SWIM is a rational solution to future modernization
and development needs, in line with the kinds of decisions made by many major
national and international corporations to create their own net-centric systems.
SWIM underlies everything: it is crucial to managing and sharing information
effectively across ATM architecture. But SWIM is complex and very big. R&D
expenditure into SWIM so far in Europe and the USA has been no more than tens of
millions of Euro/dollars. The European implementation project will be large, certainly
into the billions of Euros. From the Concept paper:
“Ground network infrastructure, system interfaces and management required
for the SWIM concept have so many unknowns that there is a high degree of
uncertainty on the cost assessment specific to SWIM.”
There are two special reasons why SWIM will not be cheap. First, because it is
crucial to operational safety and efficiency, performance requirements and safety
certification will be very demanding. Second, because of the need to have a secure
ATM system against terrorist attack and to protect the military users of SWIM and
SESAR generally, SWIM will need to meet the highest category of State and
European-level security requirements.
Controllers’ Tasks
Figure 3 shows the importance of the controller in today’s system. Figure 1 indicates
that the controller’s task will change dramatically in a SESAR concept. Focusing on
airspace capacity, these changes reduce controller taskload by some combination of:
 Automation for the routine controller task load supported by better methods of
data input and improved data management;
 Automation support to conflict/interaction detection, situation monitoring and
conflict resolution;
 Significant reduction in the need for controller tactical intervention:
o Reduction of the number of potential conflicts using deconfliction methods;
o Redistribution of the tactical intervention tasks to the pilots when
appropriate through cooperative separation or self-separation.
All of these ideas have a long history of research and development work, alas not all
of it completely successful. The most relevant large-scale R&D study into 4D-
trajectory ATM was the PHARE (Programme for Harmonised ATM Research in
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Million [For background material, reports and presentations, see
http://www.eurocontrol.int/phare/public/subsite_homepage/homepage.html]. PHARE
demonstrated that 4D concepts, air-ground datalinking and controller tools worked
well technically – all elements that have been further improved over the last decade.
But PHARE did not prove that airspace capacity would increase as a consequence of
these technological improvements. Possible reasons for this included insufficient
training of controllers, lack of trust in the tools by controllers, and operational
procedures and working methods not optimised to tools. PHARE was productive but
unbalanced: it allocated insufficient attention and resources into controller taskload
aspects.
However, the SESAR Concept devotes less than two pages to ‘Humans and
Automation’, and most of the text lists the concerns that need to be tackled and
general principles to be adopted rather than their solutions and implementations.
Identifying high priority problems is not the same as finding answers to them and
demonstrating that they work in the real world. Setting high-level principles for
automation – with origins traceable to more than fifty years ago, and which are still
not definitive (Sheridan, 2000) – is a starting point rather than a bankable assurance
of practical automation designs. This is an intrinsically tough challenge – it is not
some kind of self-serving psychobabble by Human Factors experts!
The key to SESAR success may well require an answer to the problem left open by
PHARE. As noted by a French PHARE participant (Pavet, 2000): is the way forward
to promote a “reinforcement of cognitive capability of controller” or is it to “deliver an
automated system where controllers’ role in scenario… becomes routine interlaced
with exception management”. Again, the key to success will be demonstrating a
feasible automation path to the financial decision-makers. This is a crucial topic for
decision-makers as staff costs are and are expected to continue to be a large
proportion of direct ATM costs (Concept paper page 103 and related text).
Further Reading
The sources quoted are good starting points for further reading. There is an
enormous amount of activity on NextGen and SESAR. A recent progress report on
NextGen/SESAR R&D work is on the Eurocontrol Meetings website
(http://www.eurocontrol.int/moc-faa-euro/public/standard_page/TIMS.html), the mid-
2007 Workshop presentations are particularly interesting. One of the most important
– and technically demanding – elements in NextGen/SESAR is Trajectory Prediction,
particularly in the ‘Courage’ programme; again, key papers by technical experts are
on the Eurocontrol website.
There are comparatively few publications so far on the safety issues raised by
SESAR. The key problem is not that SESAR will be safe, but how to prove that all
the transitional steps to the Concept will be safe. Note that some of these transitional
steps will involve airspace containing mixed populations of aircraft, eg some with and
some without the most developed 4D FMS. The radical system changes envisaged
and the number of technical/operational options still available mean that these
assessments would be much more complex than proving that new ATM sub-systems
or limited-scope operational changes are safe (Brooker, 2007).
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8Business Trajectory
Aim to execute each flight as close as possible to the operator’s intention
Changes to the Business Trajectory minimised
Collaborative Decision Making (CDM)
Business Trajectories are 4D and flown with much higher precision than today
Trajectory Management focus
Airspace users fly preferred routeing without pre-defined routes
Structured routes only if needed to enable the required capacity (eg congested TMAs)
Collaborative Planning
Main stakeholders collaborate in a layered planning approach
Collaborative planning matches capacity to demand, optimizes constrained resources
Integrated Airport operations
Full integration of airport operations into the trajectory management processes
Increased throughput and reduced environmental impact
New separation modes
New separation modes use trajectory control and airborne separation systems
Supported by controller and airborne tools
System Wide Information Management (SWIM)
Integrates all ATM related data
Supports CDM processes using efficient end-user applications
Humans central as managers and decision-makers
Advanced level of automation support for the humans is required
Nature of human roles and tasks necessarily change
Technology enablers
Communication systems use integrated network services for all ATM sub-systems
Data communication (rather than voice) is primary means
Primary navigation system satellite based with a terrestrial fall back solution
New surveillance systems, eg ADS-B, provide improved 4D-trajectory information
Figure 1. SESAR Components
9Figure 2. ADS-B – ‘Aircraft Text Messaging’
It’s me!
ABC100
I’m an A340!
I’m here!
x, y, z, t
I’m going there next!
x1, y1, z1, t1
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Figure 3. Schematic – highly simplified – of today’s Air Traffic Control (ATC) Concept
Fixes that flight will cross 3D Trajectory
Estimated time and level
crossing each fix
Controller notes each fix
time and level
If two aircraft at a fix have same
time and level, controller delays
an aircraft at proceeding fix /
alters its level / re-routes
Pass ‘clearance’ to aircraft to
carry out flight
4D User Preferred
Trajectory
Trajectory
‘Negotiation’
ATC model of 4D
Trajectory
Conflict prevention
ATC build ‘model’ of aircraft
trajectories: in data, displays,
”in controller’s head”
ATC Monitor aircraft’s flight
Need to correct model or aircraft
trajectory if an aircraft deviates?
Conflicting trajectories due to ‘Intent
Failure’?
‘What-if’ model deconfliction
Ongoing task
Monitoring
- Cognitive
- Automated (STCA)
Choose preferred deconfliction
Transmit the deconfliction action
to the aircraft
Monitor the implementation of the
deconfliction
ATC Safety
Action
TCAS Safety
Action
Trajectory
Prediction
ATC
safety
loop
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Figure 4. Sketch of safety thinking underlying SESAR-like Concepts
[4DT = Four Dimensional Trajectory]
But aircraft FMS can fly
highly accurate 4DT
Air-ground datalink can
ensure pilot and controller
have the same knowledge
about the 4DT Intent
But if the same ‘safe’ 4DT Intent is
known to all and the FMS flies it
accurately, then any marked deviation
from the flightpath is safety significant
Virtually all current significant
ATM safety incidents occur
because of a Failure of
Reasonable Intent
Position Integrity: Positional
equipment functions ‘normally’?
Errors on FMS, radar, GPS,
altimetry, measurements are not
extreme, displays work properly,
signals are not corrupted or lost,
etc?
Reasonable Intent: Controller
does what a competent controller
judges a reasonable course of
action? Pilot does something that
other pilots judge sensible?
Human factors issue: includes
misjudgements and blunders
How might aircraft collide?
Two possible precursor modes
But satellite positional
information is now
highly accurate
4D Intent flightpath and actual flightpath
information are in ATM System Wide
Information Management system
Conflict detection can be highly reliable
Automatic conflict
detection achieved quickly
There is plenty of time to
resolve conflicts safely
ATC Safety Loop is very
demanding ( taskload ~
airspace capacity), and
controller needs plenty of time
to detect and act (ie large
separation minima)
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Figure 5. Airprox ‘Main Causes’
[Author’s analysis of a sample of 117 recent UK Airproxes (ATM incident reports)
involving commercial flights. Eliminated from data set: Airproxes in ‘uncontrolled’
airspace (Class F/G), military zones, North Sea; military aircraft, parachutist,
balloons, sighting reports. Data from Reports 11 to 16,
http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/.]
56%
35%
Controller
Pilot
Airspace
Incorrect Readback
Technical
3%
3% 3%
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Figure 6. System Wide Information Management (SWIM) Schematic: adapted from Sayadian and Weill (2004)
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